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Abstract
In this two-part paper, we address the problem of finding the optimal precoding/multiplexing
scheme for a set of non-cooperative links sharing the same physical resources, e.g., time and band-
width. We consider two alternative optimization problems: P.1) the maximization of mutual in-
formation on each link, given constraints on the transmit power and spectral mask; and P.2) the
maximization of the transmission rate on each link, using finite order constellations, under the same
constraints as in P.1, plus a constraint on the maximum average error probability on each link.
Aiming at finding decentralized strategies, we adopted as optimality criterion the achievement of a
Nash equilibrium and thus we formulated both problems P.1 and P.2 as strategic noncooperative
(matrix-valued) games. In Part I of this two-part paper, after deriving the optimal structure of the
linear transceivers for both games, we provided a unified set of sufficient conditions that guarantee
the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. In this Part II, we focus on the achievement of the equilib-
rium and propose alternative distributed iterative algorithms that solve both games. Specifically, the
new proposed algorithms are the following: 1) the sequential and simultaneous iterative waterfill-
ing based algorithms, incorporating spectral mask constraints; 2) the sequential and simultaneous
gradient projection based algorithms, establishing an interesting link with variational inequality
problems. Our main contribution is to provide sufficient conditions for the global convergence of
all the proposed algorithms which, although derived under stronger constraints, incorporating for
example spectral mask constraints, have a broader validity than the convergence conditions known
in the current literature for the sequential iterative waterfilling algorithm.
1 Introduction and Motivation
The goal of this two-part paper is to find the optimal precoding/multiplexing schemes for a set of
non-cooperative links sharing the same physical resources, e.g. time and bandwidth. Two alterna-
tive optimization problems are considered [1]: P.1) the maximization of mutual information on each
link, given constraints on the transmit power and spectral emission mask, imposed by radio spectrum
regulatory bodies; and P.2) the maximization of the transmission rate on each link, using finite or-
der constellations, under the same constraints as in P.1, plus a constraint on the maximum average
∗This work was supported by the SURFACE project funded by the European Community under Contract IST-4-
027187-STP-SURFACE.
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error probability on each link. We focus on decentralized strategies to avoid coordination among the
separated links and the heavy signaling required by a global controller that would need to collect all
relevant information from all the users. The search for decentralized solutions motivated our formu-
lation within the convenient framework of game theory. We thus adopt as optimality criterion the
achievement of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) [2] and we cast both optimization problems P.1 and P.2 as
strategic non-cooperative (matrix-valued) games [1], where the goal of each user is to optimize its own
precoding/multiplexing matrix. In Part I of this two-part paper [1, Theorem 1], we proved that there is
no performance loss in reducing both original matrix-valued games into a unified vector-valued power
control game, where the optimal strategy of each user corresponds to finding the power allocation
that maximizes its own (information) rate, treating the multiuser interference due to the other users
as additive colored noise. We will refer to this power control game as rate-maximization game. In
Part I, we proved that the solution set of the rate-maximization game is always nonempty and derived
(sufficient) conditions that guarantee the uniqueness of the NE [1, Theorem 2]. In this Part II, we
propose alternative algorithms that reach the Nash equilibria of the unified vector game, in a totally
distributed manner.
All the distributed algorithms used to compute the Nash equilibria of a (rational [2]) strategic
non-cooperative game are based on a simple idea: Each player optimizes iteratively its own payoff
function following a prescribed updating schedule, for example, simultaneously with the other users
(i.e., according to a Jacobi scheme [3]), or sequentially (i.e., according to a Gauss-Seidel scheme [3]).
Differently from the optimization of a single-user system, where the optimal transceiver structure can
be obtained in a single shot (depending on the interference scenario [4]-[6]), in a competitive multiuser
context like a game, it is necessary to adopt an iterative algorithm, as each user’s choice affects the
interference perceived by the other users. However, the competitive nature of the multiuser system
does not guarantee in general the convergence of such an iterative scheme, even if the payoff function
of each player is strictly concave (or strictly convex) in its own strategies and the NE is unique. This
issue motivated several works in the literature [7]-[11], [21]-[29], where alternative approaches have been
proposed to study the convergence of iterative algorithms in strategic non-cooperative games.
A traditional approach comes from classical scalar power control problems in flat-fading CDMA
(or TDMA/FDMA) wireless networks (either cellular or ad-hoc) [7]-[16],1 where each user has only
one variable to optimize: its transmit power. This kind of problems can be elegantly recast as convex
optimization problems (see, e.g., [18]-[20]) or as the so called “standard” problems (in the sense of
[9]-[11]), for which distributed (either synchronous or asynchronous) algorithms along with their con-
vergence properties are available [7]-[16], [20]. The rate-maximization game proposed in this paper is
more involved, as it falls in the class of vector power control problems, where each player has a vector
to optimize (i.e., its power allocation across frequency bins) and the best-response function of each
user (the waterfilling mapping) is not a standard function (in the sense of [9]-[11]). Hence, the classical
framework of [7]-[11] cannot be successfully applied to our game theoretical formulation.
1Note that, even though some of these papers do not contain any explicit reference to game theory, the problems
therein can be naturally reformulated as a strategic non-cooperative game, where the Nash equilibria are the fixed-points
of proper best response correspondences.
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A special case of the rate-maximization game proposed in this paper was studied in [21] in the
absence of spectral mask constraints, where the authors formulated the vector power control problem
for a Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) system, modelled as a Gaussian frequency-selective interference
channel, as a two-person strategic non-cooperative game. To reach the Nash equilibria of the game,
the authors proposed the sequential Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm (IWFA), which is an instance
of the Gauss-Seidel scheme [3]: The users maximize their own information rates sequentially (one
after the other), according to a fixed updating order. Each user performs the single-user waterfilling
solution given the interference generated by the others as additive (colored) noise. The most appealing
features of the sequential IWFA are its low-complexity and its distributed nature. In fact, to compute
the waterfilling solution, each user only needs to measure the noise-plus-interference Power Spectral
Density (PSD), without requiring specific knowledge of the power allocations and the channel transfer
functions of the other users. The convergence of the sequential IWFA has been studied in a number
of works [22]-[28], each time obtaining milder conditions that guarantee convergence. However, despite
its appealing properties, the sequential IWFA suffers from slow convergence if the number of users in
the network is large, because of the sequential updating strategy. In addition, the algorithm requires
some form of central scheduling to determine the order in which users update their strategy.
The original contributions of this paper with respect to the current literature on vector games [21]-
[26] are listed next. First, to compute the Nash equilibria of both games P.1 and P.2 (introduced in
Part I [1]), we generalize the sequential IWFA of [21], including the spectral mask constraint and a
possible memory in the updating process. Then, to overcome the potential slow convergence rate of the
sequential IWFA, we propose a new iterative algorithm, called simultaneous IWFA. The simultaneous
IWFA is an instance of the Jacobi scheme [3]: At each iteration, all users update their own strategies
simultaneously, still according to the single-user waterfilling solution, but using the interference gen-
erated by the others in the previous iteration. We provide results on the convergence speed of both
algorithms, showing that the simultaneous IWFA is faster than the sequential IWFA, still keeping the
desired properties of the sequential IWFA, i.e., its distributed nature and low complexity. The second
important contribution of the paper is to provide a unified set of sufficient conditions ensuring the global
convergence of both algorithms. Our conditions are proved to have broader validity than those given
in [21]-[25], [26] (obtained without mask constraints) and, more recently, in [27] (obtained including
mask constraints) for the sequential IWFA. Moreover, they show that the range of applicability with
guaranteed convergence of both sequential and simultaneous IWFAs includes scenarios where the inter-
fering users may be rather close to each other. Finally, exploring the link between the Nash equilibria
of our game theoretical formulation and the solutions to the so-called variational inequality problems
[30]-[32], we propose, as alternative to the IWFAs, two novel gradient projection based iterative al-
gorithms, namely the sequential and simultaneous Iterative Gradient Projection Algorithms (IGPAs)
and provide conditions for their global convergence.
Throughout the paper, there is a common thread relating the algorithms and the derivation of their
convergence conditions: The interpretation of the waterfilling operator as the Euclidean projector of a
vector onto a convex set. In the single-user case, this provides an alternative perspective of the well-
known waterfilling solution, that dates back to Shannon in 1949 [33]. Interestingly, in the multiuser
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case, this interpretation plays a key role in proving the convergence of the proposed algorithms.
The paper is organized as follows. After briefly reviewing, in Section 2, the game theoretic formu-
lation addressed in Part I of the paper [1, Theorem 2], Section 3 provides the interpretation of the
waterfilling operator as a projector. Section 4 contains the main contribution of the paper: A variety
of distributed algorithms for the computation of the Nash equilibria of the game, along with their
convergence properties. Finally, in Section 5, some conclusions are drawn. Preliminary versions of this
paper appeared in [25, 28, 29].
2 System Model and Problem Formulation
We consider a Gaussian vector interference channel [35], composed by Q non-cooperative links. Aiming
at finding distributed algorithms, we focus on transmission techniques where no interference cancellation
is performed and multiuser interference is treated as additive colored noise. Moreover, we consider a
block transmission without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.), as it is a capacity-lossless strategy for sufficiently
large block length [36]-[38]. Then, under assumptions detailed in Part I [1], the system design consists
in finding the optimal transmit/receive matrix pair for each link independently of the others, according
to some performance metrics. In Part I of this paper [1], we assumed as optimality criterion the
achievement of the NE and considered the two following strategic non-cooperative games:
P.1 The maximization of mutual information on each link, given constraints on the transmit power
and on the spectral radiation mask;
P.2 The maximization of the transmission rate on each link, using finite order constellations, under
the same constraints as in P.1 plus a constraint on the average (uncoded) error probability.
After showing that the solution set of both games is always nonempty, in [1, Theorem 1] we proved
that the optimal transmission strategy for each link leads to Gaussian signaling plus the diagonal
transmission through the channel eigenmodes (i.e., the frequency subchannels), irrespective of the
channel state, power budget, spectral mask constraints and interference levels. Thanks to this result,
both matrix-valued games P.1 and P.2 can be recast, with no performance loss, as the following simpler
vector power control game [1, Theorem 1]:
(G ) :
maximize
pq
Rq(pq,p−q)
subject to pq ∈ Pq
, ∀q ∈ Ω, (1)
where Ω , {1, 2, . . . , Q} is the set of players (i.e., active links), Pq is the set of admissible strategies of
player q :2
Pq ,
{
pq ∈ R
N :
1
N
N∑
k=1
pq(k) = 1, 0 ≤ pq(k) ≤ p
max
q (k), ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}
}
, (2)
2In order to avoid the trivial solution p⋆q(k) = p
max
q (k) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (1/N)
PN
k=1 p
max
q (k) > 1 is assumed for
all q ∈ Ω. Furthermore, in the feasible strategy set of each player, we can replace, w.l.o.g., the original inequality power
constraint (1/N)
PN
k=1 pq(k) ≤ 1, with equality, since, at the optimum, this constraint must be satisfied with equality
from all users.
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where pmaxq (k) , p
max
q (k)/Pq , with p
max
q (k) denoting the maximum power that is allowed to be allocated
on the k-th frequency bin from the q-th user, and Rq(pq,p−q) is the payoff function of player q :
Rq(pq,p−q) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
1
Γq
sinrq(k)
)
, (3)
with
sinrq(k) =
Pq
∣∣H¯qq(k)∣∣2 pq(k)/dγqq
σ2q +
∑
r 6=q Pr
∣∣H¯rq(k)∣∣2 pr(k)/dγrq , |Hqq(k)|
2 pq(k)
1 +
∑
r 6=q |Hrq(k)|
2 pr(k)
, (4)
where Hrq(k) , H¯rq(k)
√
Pr/
(
σ2q d
γ
rq
)
; H¯rq(k) denotes the frequency-response on the subcarrier k of
the channel between source r and destination q, drq is the distance between source r and destination q,
and γ is the path loss. The SNR gap Γq in (3) is set equal to 1 if game in P.1 is considered, whereas
Γq = (Q
−1(P ⋆e,q/4))
2/3 [39], if we consider P.2, where Q(·) denotes the Q-function [34] and P ⋆e,q is the
maximum tolerable (uncoded) average symbol error probability on link q.
In [1, Theorem 2], we showed that the solution set of G is always nonempty and coincides with the
solution set of the following nonlinear fixed-point equation:
p⋆q = WFq
(
p⋆1, . . . ,p
⋆
q−1,p
⋆
q+1, . . . ,p
⋆
Q
)
= WFq(p
⋆
−q) , ∀q ∈ Ω, (5)
with the waterfilling operator WFq (·) defined as
[WFq (p−q)]k ,
[
µq − Γq
1 +
∑
r 6=q |Hrq(k)|
2 pr(k)
|Hqq(k)|
2
]pmaxq (k)
0
, k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (6)
where [x]ba denotes the Euclidean projection of x onto the interval [a, b].
3 The water-level µq is chosen
to satisfy the power constraint (1/N)
∑N
k=1 p
⋆
q(k) = 1.
Observe that system (5) contains, as special cases, the solutions to power control games already
studied in the literature [21]-[26], when all the players are assumed to transmit with the same power
and no spectral mask constraints are imposed (i.e., when pmaxq (k) = +∞, ∀q, ∀k). In this case, the
Nash equilibria of game G are given by the classical simultaneous waterfilling solutions [21]-[26], where
WFq (·) in (5) is still obtained from (6) simply setting p
max
q (k) = +∞, ∀q, ∀k. However, in the presence
of spectral mask constraints, the results of [21]-[26] cannot be applied to system (5). In Part I of this
paper [1, Theorem 2], we studied system (5) and provided sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the
solution. The problem we address here is how to reach solutions to (5) (leading to the Nash equilibria
of G ) by means of totally distributed algorithms.
3 Waterfilling Operator as a Projector
In this section we provide an interpretation of the waterfilling operator as a proper Euclidean projector.
This interpretation will be instrumental to prove the convergence properties of some of the algorithms
proposed in the subsequent sections.
3The Euclidean projection [x]ba is defined as follows: [x]
b
a = a, if x ≤ a, [x]
b
a = x, if a < x < b, and [x]
b
a = b, if x ≥ b.
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3.1 A new look at the single-user waterfilling solution
Consider a parallel additive colored Gaussian noise channel composed of N subchannels with coefficients
{H(k)}, subject to some spectral mask constraints {pmax(k)}Nk=1 and to a global average transmit power
constraint across the subchannels. It is well-known that the capacity-achieving solution for this channel
is obtained using independent Gaussian signaling across the subchannels with the following waterfilling
power allocation [40]
p⋆(k) =
[
µ−
σ2k
|H(k)|2
]pmax(k)
0
, k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (7)
where σ2k denotes the noise variance on the k-th subchannel, p
⋆(k) is the optimal power allocation
over the k-th subchannel. The water-level µ in (7) is chosen in order to satisfy the power constraint
(1/N)
∑N
k=1 p
⋆(k) = 1.
We show now that, interestingly, the solution in (7) can be interpreted as the Euclidean projection
of the vector −insr, defined as
insr ,
[
σ21/|H(1)|
2, . . . , σ2N/|H(N)|
2
]T
(8)
onto the simplex
S ,
{
x ∈ RN :
1
N
N∑
k=1
xk = 1, 0 ≤ xk≤p
max(k), ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}
}
. (9)
Lemma 1 The Euclidean projection of the N -dimensional real nonpositive vector −x0 , −[x0,1, . . . , x0,N ]
T
onto the simplex S defined in (9), denoted by [−x0]S , is by definition the solution to the following convex
optimization problem:
minimize
x
‖x− (−x0)‖
2
2
subject to 0 ≤ xk≤p
max(k), ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}
1
N
N∑
k=1
xk = 1.
(10)
and assumes the following form:
x⋆k = [µ− x0,k]
pmax(k)
0 , k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (11)
where µ > 0 is chosen in order to satisfy the constraint (1/N)
∑N
k=1 x
⋆
k = 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 is an extension of [46, Lemma 1] to the case where interval bounds [0, pmax(k)] are included
in the optimization. But what is important to remark about Lemma 1 (and this is a contribution of
this paper) is that it allows us to interpret the waterfilling operator as a projector, according to the
following corollary.
Corollary 1 The waterfilling solution p⋆ = [p⋆(1), . . . , p⋆(N)]T in (7) can be expressed as the projec-
tion of −insr given in (8) onto the simplex S in (9):
p⋆ = [−insr]S . (12)
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Corollary 2 The waterfilling solution in the form
p⋆(k) =
[
µ
wk
−
σ2k
|H(k)|2
]pmax(k)
0
, k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (13)
where w = [w1, . . . , wN ]
T is any positive vector, can be expressed as the projection with respect to the
weighted Euclidean norm4 with weights w1, . . . , wN , of −insr given in (8) onto the simplex S in (9):
p⋆ = [−insr]wS . (14)
The graphical interpretation of the waterfilling solution as a Euclidean projector, for the single-
carrier two-user case, is given in Figure 1: For any insr ≡ (insr1, insr2) corresponding to a point in
the interior of the gray region (e.g., point A), the waterfilling solution allocates power over both the
channels. If, instead, the vector insr is outside the gray region (e.g., point B), all the power is allocated
only over one channel, the one with the highest normalized gain.
Figure 1: Graphical interpretation of waterfilling solution (7) as a projection onto the two-dimensional simplex.
3.2 Simultaneous multiuser waterfilling
In the multiuser scenario described in game G , the optimal power allocation of each user depends on
the power allocation of the other users through the received interference, according to the simultaneous
multiuser waterfilling solution in (5).
As in the single-user case, introducing the vector insrq(p−q), defined as
[insrq(p−q)]k , Γq
1 +
∑
r 6=q |Hrq(k)|
2 pr(k)
|Hqq(k)|
2 , k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (15)
and invoking Lemma 1, we obtain the following corollary.
4The weighted Euclidean norm ‖x‖2,w is defined as ‖x‖2,w , (
P
i wi |xi|
2)1/2 [44].
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Corollary 3 The waterfilling operator WFq (p−q) in (6) can be expressed as the projection of −insrq(p−q)
defined in (15) onto the simplex Pq given in (2):
WFq (p−q) = [−insrq(p−q)]Pq . (16)
Comparing (5) with (16), it is straightforward to see that all the Nash equilibria of game G can be
alternatively obtained as the fixed-points of the mapping defined in (16), whose existence is guaranteed
by [1, Theorem 2]:
p⋆q =
[
−insrq(p
⋆
−q)
]
Pq
, ∀q ∈ Ω. (17)
In Appendix B, we provide the key properties of the mapping in (16), that will be instrumental to
obtain sufficient conditions for the convergence of the distributed iterative algorithms based on the
waterfilling solution and described in Section 4.1.
4 Distributed Algorithms
In [1, Theorem 2], we proved that, under some (sufficient) conditions on transmit powers, channels and
network topology, the NE for game G is unique. Since there is no reason to expect a system to be
initially at the equilibrium, the concept of equilibrium has a useful meaning in practice only if one is
able to find a procedure that reaches such an equilibrium from non-equilibrium states. In this section,
we focus on algorithms that converge to these equilibria.
Since we are interested in a decentralized implementation, where no signaling among different users
is allowed, we consider only totally distributed iterative algorithms, where each user acts independently
of the others to optimize its own power allocation while perceiving the other users as interference.
The main issue of this approach is to guarantee the convergence of such an iterative scheme. In the
following, we propose two alternative classes of totally distributed iterative algorithms along with their
convergence properties, namely: iterative algorithms based on the waterfilling solution (6), and iterative
algorithms based on the gradient projection mapping.
4.1 Distributed algorithms based on waterfilling
So far, we have shown that the Nash equilibria of game G are fixed-points (see (5)) of the waterfilling
mapping defined in (6). Hence, to achieve these solutions by a distributed scheme, it is natural to employ
an iterative algorithm based on the best response (6). Based on this idea, we consider two classes
of iterative algorithms: sequential algorithms, where the users update their strategies sequentially
according to a given schedule; and simultaneous algorithms, where all the users update their strategies
at the same time. In the following sections, we provide a formal description of both algorithms and
derive the conditions guaranteeing their convergence to the unique NE of the game.
Before describing the proposed algorithms, we introduce the following intermediate definitions.
Given game G , let Dq ⊆ {1, · · · , N} denote the set {1, . . . , N} (possibly) deprived of the carrier indices
that user q would never use as the best response set to any strategies adopted by the other users, for
the given set of transmit power and propagation channels [1]:
Dq ,
{
k ∈ {1, . . . , N} : ∃ p−q ∈ P−q such that [WFq (p−q)]k 6= 0
}
, (18)
8
with WFq (·) defined in (6) and P−q , P1× · · ·×Pq−1×Pq+1× · · ·×PQ. In Part I of the paper [1],
we provided an iterative procedure to estimate such a set. We also introduce the matrix Hmax ∈ RQ×Q,
defined as
[Hmax]qr ,
 Γq maxk∈Dq∩Dr
|H¯rq(k)|
2
|H¯qq(k)|2
dγqq
dγrq
Pr
Pq
, if r 6= q,
0, otherwise,
(19)
with the convention that the maximum in (19) is zero if Dq ∩ Dr is empty.
4.1.1 Sequential iterative waterfilling algorithm revisited
The sequential IWFA is an instance of the Gauss-Seidel scheme [3]: All users update their own strategies
sequentially, performing the waterfilling solution (6). The algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Sequential Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm
Set p
(0)
q = any feasible power allocation, ∀q ∈ Ω;
for n = 0 : Nit
p(n+1)q =
 WFq
(
p
(n)
−q
)
, if (n+ 1)modQ = q,
p
(n)
q , otherwise,
∀q ∈ Ω; (20)
end
The convergence of the algorithm is guaranteed under the following sufficient conditions.
Theorem 1 Assume that the following condition is satisfied:
ρ (Hmax) < 1, (C1)
where Hmax is defined in (19) and ρ (Hmax) denotes the spectral radius5 of the matrix Hmax. Then, as
Nit → ∞, the sequential IWFA described in Algorithm 1 converges linearly to the unique NE of game
G , for any set of initial conditions belonging to P and for any updating schedule.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 1 − Global convergence and uniqueness of the NE. Even though the optimization
problem (1) is nonlinear, condition (C1) guarantees the global convergence of the sequential IWFA,
irrespective of the specific users’ updating order. Moreover, the global asymptotic stability of the NE
implies also the uniqueness of the equilibrium. Condition (C1) indeed coincides with the uniqueness
condition given in [1, Corollary 1].
To give additional insight into the physical interpretation of sufficient conditions for the convergence
of the sequential IWFA, we provide the following corollaries of Theorem 1.
5The spectral radius ρ (H) of the matrix H, is defined as ρ (H) = max {|λ| : λ ∈ eig (H)}, with eig (H) denoting the
set of eigenvalues of H [44].
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Corollary 4 A sufficient conditions for (C1) is given by one of the two following set of conditions:
Γq
wq
∑
r=1,r 6=q
max
k∈Dr∩Dq
{
|H¯rq(k)|
2
|H¯qq(k)|2
}
dγqq
dγrq
Pr
Pq
wr < 1, ∀q ∈ Ω, (C2)
1
wr
∑
q=1,q 6=r
Γq max
k∈Dr∩Dq
{
|H¯rq(k)|
2
|H¯qq(k)|2
}
dγqq
dγrq
Pr
Pq
wq < 1, ∀r ∈ Ω, (C3)
where w , [w1, . . . , wQ]
T is any positive vector.
Corollary 5 The best vector w in (C2)-(C3) is given by the solution to the following geometric pro-
gramming problem
minimize
w,t
t
subject to
∑
r=1,r 6=q
Grqt
−1w−1q wr ≤ 1, ∀q,
w > 0, t > 0,
(21)
where Grq is defined as
Grq , Γq max
k∈Dr∩Dq
{
|H¯rq(k)|
2
|H¯qq(k)|2
}
dγqq
dγrq
Pr
Pq
wr
wq
, (22)
if (C2) is used, or as
Grq , Γr max
k∈Dr∩Dq
{
|H¯qr(k)|
2
|H¯rr(k)|2
}
dγrr
dγqr
Pq
Pr
wq
wr
, (23)
if (C3) is used.
Note that, as by direct product of the proof of Theorem 1, one can always choose the full set
Dq = {1, . . . , N} in (C1) and (C2)-(C3). However, less stringent conditions are obtained by removing
the unnecessary carriers, i.e., the carriers that, for the given power budget and interference levels, are
never going to be used.
Remark 2 − Physical interpretation of convergence conditions. As already shown in Part
I of the paper [1] for the uniqueness conditions of the NE, the convergence of sequential IWFA is
guaranteed if the interferers are sufficiently far apart from the destinations. In fact, from (C1) or (C2)-
(C3), one infers that, for any given set of channel realizations and power constraints, there exists a
distance beyond which the sequential IWFA is guaranteed to converge, corresponding to the maximum
level of interference that may be tolerated by each receiver (as quantified, e.g., in (C2)) or that may
be generated by each transmitter (as quantified, e.g., in (C3)). Interestingly, the presence of spectral
mask constraints does not affect the convergence capability of the algorithm. Moreover, convergence
condition (C1) (or (C2)-(C3)) has the same desired properties as the uniqueness conditions obtained
in Part I of the paper: It is robust against the worst normalized channels |H¯rq(k)|
2/|H¯qq(k)|
2, since the
subchannels corresponding to the highest ratios |H¯rq(k)|
2/|H¯qq(k)|
2 (and, in particular, the subchannels
where |H¯qq(k)|
2 is vanishing) do not necessarily affect (C1) (or (C2)-(C3)), as their subcarrier indices
may not belong to the set Dq. This strongly relaxes the convergence conditions.
We can generalize the sequential IWFA given in Algorithm 1 by introducing a memory in the
updating process, as given in Algorithm 2. We call this new algorithm smoothed sequential IWFA.
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Algorithm 2: Smoothed Sequential Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm
Set p
(0)
q = any feasible power allocation and αq ∈ [0, 1), ∀q ∈ Ω;
for n = 0 : Nit
p(n+1)q =
 αqp
(n)
q + (1− αq)WFq
(
p
(n)
−q
)
, if (n+ 1)modQ = q,
p
(n)
q , otherwise,
∀q ∈ Ω; (24)
end
Each factor αq ∈ [0, 1) in Algorithm 2 can be interpreted as a forgetting factor: The larger is αq,
the longer is the memory of the algorithm. The choice of each αq depends on the channel stationarity
and on possible channel fluctuations or estimation errors. If the channel is fixed or highly stationary
and there are channel estimation errors that induce zero mean fluctuations on the allocated power, it
is convenient to take each αq close to 1, to smooth out the undesired fluctuations. Conversely, when
the channel is rapidly varying, it is better to take a small αq. Interestingly, the choice of {αq}q∈Ω does
not affect the convergence property of the algorithm, as proved in the following.
Theorem 2 Assume that conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied. Then, as Nit → ∞, the smoothed
sequential IWFA described in Algorithm 2 converges linearly to the unique NE of game G , for any set
of initial conditions in P, updating schedule, and {αq}q∈Ω, with αq ∈ [0, 1), ∀q ∈ Ω.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 3 − Comparison with previous results. The sequential IWFA described in Algorithm
1 generalizes the well-known sequential iterative waterfilling algorithm originally proposed by Yu et
al. in [21] and then studied in [22]-[26], to the case in which the users have (possibly) different power
budgets and there are spectral mask constraints. In fact, the algorithm in [21] can be obtained as
a special case of Algorithm 1, by removing the spectral mask constraints in each set Pq in (2), (i.e.,
setting pmaxq (k) = +∞, ∀k, q) and replacing the waterfilling operator in (6) with the classical waterfilling
solution
WFq (p1, . . . ,pq−1,pq+1, . . . ,pQ) ,
(
µq1− insrq(p−q)
)+ , (25)
where (x)+ = max(0, x) and insrq is defined in (15).
The convergence of the sequential IWFA based on the mapping (25) has been studied in a number
of works, each time obtaining milder convergence conditions. Specifically, in [21], the authors provided
sufficient conditions for the existence of a NE and the convergence of the sequential IWFA, for a game
composed by two players. This was later generalized to an arbitrary number of players in [22]-[25].
In [26], the case of flat-fading channels was considered. Interestingly, although derived under stronger
constraints, incorporating for example spectral mask constraints, our convergence conditions have a
broader validity than those obtained in [21]-[26], as shown in the following.6
6We summarize the main results of [21]-[25] using our notation.
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Corollary 6 Sufficient conditions for (C2) are [21, 22, 25]
Γq max
k∈{1,...,N}
{
|H¯rq(k)|
2
|H¯qq(k)|2
}
dαqq
dαrq
Pr
Pq
<
1
Q− 1
, ∀ r, q 6= r ∈ Ω, (C4)
or [23]
Γq max
k∈{1,...,N}
{
|H¯rq(k)|
2
|H¯qq(k)|2
}
dαqq
dαrq
Pr
Pq
<
1
2Q− 3
, ∀ r, q 6= r ∈ Ω. (C5)
In the case of flat-fading channels (i.e., H¯rq(k) = H¯rq, ∀r, q), condition (C2) becomes [26]
Γq
Q∑
r=1,r 6=q
|H¯rq|
2
|H¯qq|2
dαqq
dαrq
Pr
Pq
< 1, ∀q ∈ Ω. (26)
Recently, alternative sufficient conditions for the convergence of sequential IWFA as given in Algo-
rithm 1 were independently given in [27].7 Specifically, the sequential IWFA was proved to converge to
the unique NE of the game if the following condition is satisfied:8
ρ (Υ) < 1, (C6)
where ρ (Υ) denotes the spectral radius of the matrix Υ , (I−Hmaxlow )
−1Hmaxupp , with H
max
low and H
max
upp
denoting the strictly lower and strictly upper triangular part of the matrix Hmax, respectively, with
Hmax defined, in our notation, as in (19), where each Dq is replaced by the full set {1, . . . , N}.
As an example, in Figure 2, we compare the range of validity of our convergence condition (C1)
with that of (C4) and (C6), over a set of channel impulse responses generated as vectors composed of
i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance. In the figure, we plot the
probability that conditions (C1), (C4) and (C6) are satisfied versus the ratio drq/dqq, which measures
how far apart are the interferers from the destination, with respect to the intended source. In Figure
2(a) we consider a system composed by Q = 5 users, and in Figure 2(b) a system with Q = 15 links. For
the sake of simplicity, to limit the number of free parameters, we assumed drq = dqr, Pq = Pr ∀r, q, and
w = 1. We tested our condition considering the set Dq, obtained using the algorithm given in [1]. We
can see, from Figure 2, that the probability of guaranteeing convergence increases as the distance of the
interferers, normalized to the source-destination distance, increases (i.e., the ratio drq/dqq increases).
Interestingly, the probability that (C1) is satisfied, differently from (C4) and (C6), exhibits a neat
threshold behavior as it transits very rapidly from the non-convergence guarantee to the almost certain
convergence, as the ratio drq/dqq increases by a small percentage. This shows that the convergence
conditions depend, fundamentally, on the interferers distance, rather than on the channel realizations.
Finally, it is worthwhile noticing that our conditions have a broader validity than (C4) and (C6). As an
example, for a system with probability of guaranteeing convergence of 0.99 and Q = 15, conditions (C1)
only require drq/dqq ≃ 4.2, whereas conditions (C4) and (C6) require drq/dqq > 50 and drq/dqq ≃ 40,
respectively. Furthermore, comparing Figure 2(a) with Figure 2(b), one can see that this difference
increases as the number Q of links increases.
Remark 4 − Distributed nature of the algorithm. The sequential IWFA as described in Algo-
rithms 1 and 2 can be implemented in a distributed way, since each user, to maximize its own rate,
7We thank Prof. Facchinei, who kindly brought to our attention reference [27], after this paper was completed.
8We write conditions of [27] using our notation.
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Figure 2: Probability of (C1), (C4) and (C6) versus drq/dqq ; Q = 5 [subplot (a)], Q = 15 [subplot (b)], γ = 2.5, drq = dqr ,
drr = dqq = 1, Pq = Pr, Γq = 1, Pq/σ2q = 7dB, Pr/(σ
2
qd
γ
rq) = 3dB, ∀r, q ∈ Ω, w = 1.
needs only to measure the PSD of the thermal noise plus the overall MUI (see (4)). However, despite
its appealing properties, the algorithm may suffer from slow convergence if the number of users in the
network is large, as we will also show in Section 4.1.3. This drawback is due to the sequential schedule
in the users’ updates, wherein each user, to choose its own strategy, is forced to wait for all the other
users scheduled before. Moreover, although distributed, both algorithms require that all users share a
prescribed updating schedule. This requires a centralized synchronization mechanism that determines
the order and the update times of the users. We show next how to remove these limitations.
4.1.2 Simultaneous iterative waterfilling algorithm
To overcome the main limitation of sequential IWFAs given in Algorithms 1 and 2, we consider in this
section the simultaneous version of the IWFA, called simultaneous IWFA. The algorithm is an instance
of the Jacobi scheme [3]: At each iteration, all users update their own power allocation simultaneously,
performing the waterfilling solution (6), given the interference generated by the other users in the
previous iteration. Stated in mathematical terms, the proposed algorithm is described in Algorithm 3
[28, 29].
Algorithm 3: Simultaneous Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm
Set p
(0)
q = any feasible power allocation, ∀q ∈ Ω;
for n = 0 : Nit
p(n+1)q = WFq
(
p
(n)
1 , . . . ,p
(n)
q−1,p
(n)
q+1, . . . ,p
(n)
Q
)
, ∀q ∈ Ω, (27)
end
As for the sequential IWFA, also in the simultaneous IWFA we can introduce a memory in the
updating process and obtain the so-called smoothed simultaneous IWFA, as described in Algorithm 4
[28, 29].
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Algorithm 4: Smoothed Simultaneous Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm
Set p
(0)
q = any feasible power allocation and αq ∈ [0, 1), ∀q ∈ Ω;
for n = 0 : Nit
p(n+1)q = αqp
(n)
q + (1− αq)WFq
(
p
(n)
1 , . . . ,p
(n)
q−1,p
(n)
q+1, . . . ,p
(n)
Q
)
, ∀q ∈ Ω, (28)
end
Interestingly, both Algorithm 3 and 4 are guaranteed to globally converge to the unique NE of the
game, under the same sufficient conditions of the sequential IWFA, as proved in the following.
Theorem 3 Assume that conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied. Then, as Nit→∞, the simultaneous
IWFAs described in Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 converge linearly to the unique NE of game G , for
any set of initial conditions in P and {αq}q∈Ω, with αq ∈ [0, 1), ∀q ∈ Ω.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Additional (weaker) convergence conditions for Algorithm 3 and 4 are given next. Introducing the
matrix H(k) ∈ RQ×Q, defined as
[H(k)]qr ,
 Γq
|H¯rq(k)|
2
|H¯qq(k)|2
dγqq
dγrq
Pr
Pq
, if k ∈ Dq ∩Dr, and q 6= r,
0, otherwise,
(29)
we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4 Assume that the following conditions are satisfied:
ρ1/2
(
HT (k)H(k)
)
< 1, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (30)
where H(k) is defined in (29). Then, as Nit → ∞, the sequential IWFA9 described in Algorithm 3
converges linearly to the unique NE of game G , for any set of initial conditions in P.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Remark 5 − Sequential versus simultaneous IWFA. Since both simultaneous IWFAs in Algo-
rithms 3 and 4 are still based on the waterfilling solution (6), they keep the most appealing features
of the sequential IWFA, namely its low-complexity and distributed nature. In fact, as in the sequen-
tial IWFA, also in the simultaneous IWFA each user only needs to locally measure the PSD of the
interference received from the other users and water-pour over this level. In addition, thanks to the
Jacobi-based update, all the users are allowed to choose their optimal power allocation simultaneously.
Hence, the simultaneous IWFA is expected to be faster than the sequential IWFA, especially if the
number of active users in the network is large. We formalize this intuition in the next section.
9Condition (30) is sufficient also for the convergence of the smoothed simultaneous IWFA described in Algorithm 4,
provided that the second hand-side of (30) is replaced by ǫ =
1−maxq∈Ω αq
1−minq∈Ω αq
≤ 1.
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4.1.3 Asymptotic convergence rate
In this section we provide an upper bound of the convergence rate of both (smoothed) sequential and
simultaneous IWFAs. The convergence rate can be either measured on the average or for the worst
possible initial vector p(0). In the following we focus on the latter approach, introducing the asymptotic
convergence exponent.
Denoting by p⋆ and p(n) the NE of game G and the power allocation vector obtained by the proposed
algorithm at the n-th iteration, respectively, the distance between p(n) and p⋆ can be measured by some
vector norm
∥∥p(n) − p⋆∥∥ , which is to be compared with the initial distance ∥∥p(0) − p⋆∥∥ . This leads to
the following asymptotic convergence exponent for the worst-case convergence rate [43]:
d = − sup
p(0) 6=p⋆
lim
n→∞
1
n
ln
(∥∥p(n) − p⋆∥∥∥∥p(0) − p⋆∥∥
)
. (31)
Since for large n ∥∥∥p(n) − p⋆∥∥∥ ≃ Ce−dn, (32)
where C is a constant that depends on the initial conditions, d gives the (asymptotic) number of
iterations for the error to decrease by the factor 1/e (for the worst possible initial vector).
Since the waterfilling operator is not a monotone mapping, only (upper) bounds for the asymptotic
convergence exponent can be obtained [41, 42], as given in the following.
Proposition 1 Let d lowseq and d
low
sim be lower bound of d in (31) obtained using (smoothed) sequential
IWFA in Algorithm 2 and (smoothed) simultaneous IWFA in Algorithm 4, respectively. Under condition
(C2) of Corollary 4, we have
d lowseq = − log
max
q∈Ω
αq + (1− αq)Γqwq ∑
r 6=q
max
k∈Dr∩Dq
{
|H¯rq(k)|
2
|H¯qq(k)|2
}
dγqq
dγrq
Pr
Pq
wr

 , (33)
d lowsim = Q d
low
seq . (34)
Proof. The proof follows directly from Proposition 2 in Appendix B.
Remark 6 − Convergence speed. Expression (33) shows that the convergence speed of the algo-
rithms depends, as expected, on the memory factors {αq}q∈Ω and on the level of interference. Given
{αq}q∈Ω, the convergence speed increases as the interference level decreases. Since d
low
sim and d
low
seq are
only bounds of the asymptotic convergence exponent, a comparison between the sequential IWFA and
the simultaneous IWFA by d lowsim and d
low
seq might not be fair. These bound becomes meaningful if d
low
sim
and d lowseq approximate with equality dsim and dseq, respectively, for some initial conditions (cf. [41]).
In Figure 3 we compare the performance of the sequential and simultaneous IWFA, in terms of
convergence speed. We consider a network composed of 50 links and we show the rate evolution of
three of the links corresponding to the sequential IWFA and simultaneous IWFA as a function of the
iteration index n as defined in Algorithms 1 and 3. To make the figure not excessively overcrowded,
we report only the curves of 3 out of 50 links. As expected, the sequential IWFA is slower than the
simultaneous IWFA, especially if the number of active links Q is large, since each user is forced to wait
for all the users scheduled in advance, before updating its own power allocation.
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4.2 Distributed algorithms based on gradient projection
In this section we propose two alternative distributed algorithms based on the Gradient Projection
mapping. The first algorithm is an instance of the Jacobi scheme, whereas the second one is based
on the Gauss-Seidel procedure. Both algorithms come out from an interesting interpretation of the
Nash equilibria in (5) as solutions to a proper Nonlinear Variational Inequality (NVI) problem [30,
Sec. 1.4.2], as we show next. The NVI problem is defined as follows. Given a subset X ⊂ Rn of the
Euclidean n-th dimensional space Rn and a mapping f : Rn 7→ Rn, the (nonlinear) variational inequality
is to find a vector x⋆ ∈ X such that [30, Def. 1.1.1]
(NVI) (x− x⋆)T f(x⋆) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X . (35)
All the Nash equilibria in (5) of game G , can be written as solutions to a NVI problem. In fact,
a feasible strategy profile p⋆ = [p⋆T1 , . . . ,p
⋆T
Q ]
T satisfies (5) if and only if the following necessary and
sufficient optimality conditions hold true [45]:10
(pq−p
⋆
q)
T (−∇qRq(p
⋆
q ,p
⋆
−q)) ≥ 0, ∀pq ∈ Pq, ∀q ∈ Ω, (36)
where ∇qRq(p
⋆
q ,p
⋆
−q) denotes the gradient vector of Rq with respect to pq, evaluated in (p
⋆
q ,p
⋆
−q), and
Pq is defined in (2). Comparing (35) with (36), it is straightforward to see that a strategy profile p
⋆
is a NE of G if and only if it is a solution to the NVI problem (35), with the following identifications:
X = X1 × . . .×XQ ←→ P = P1 × . . .×PQ, (37)
x = [xT1 , . . . ,x
T
Q]
T ←→ p = [pT1 , . . . ,p
T
Q]
T (38)
fq(xq,x−q) ←→ − ∇qRq(pq,p−q), (39)
10Observe that, given the strategy profiles of the other players, the optimal strategy of each player is a solution to the
convex optimization problem defined in (1), whose optimality conditions, for any given q and p⋆−q, can be written as in
(36) [45, Sec. 4.2.3].
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where fq(x) denotes the q-th component of f(x) = [f1(x), . . . , fQ(x)]
T . In fact, if (36) is satisfied
for each q, then summing over q, (35) follows. Conversely, assume that (35) holds true for some
p⋆. Then, for any given q, choosing p−q = p
⋆
−q and pq ∈ Pq, we have p , (pq,p
⋆
−q) ∈ P and
(p− p⋆)T [−∇T1R1(p
⋆), . . . ,−∇TQRQ(p
⋆)]T = (pq−p
⋆
q)
T (−∇qRq(p
⋆
q,p
⋆
−q)) ≥ 0, ∀pq ∈ Pq.
Building on the equivalence between (35) and (36) [30, 32], we can obtain distributed algorithms
that reach the Nash equilibria of game G by looking for algorithms that solve the NVI problem in (35).
A similar approach was already followed in [23], where the equivalence between the Nash equilibria of
a DSL game that is a special case of G and the solutions to a proper nonlinear complementary problem
[30] was shown. However, the algorithms proposed in [23] to compute the NE solutions, in general,
cannot be implemented in a distributed way, since they need a centralized control having access to all
channel state information and to the PSD of all users. Differently from [23], we exploit the equivalence
between (35) and (36) and propose two alternative totally distributed algorithms that do not require
any centralized control to be implemented and have the same computational complexity as the IWFAs.
To this end, we need the following intermediate result that comes directly from the NVI formulation
in (36) [3, Prop. 5.1].
Lemma 2 Let β be a positive scalar and {Gq}q∈Ω be a set of symmetric positive definite matrices.
A vector p⋆ = [p⋆T1 , . . . ,p
⋆T
Q ]
T is a NE of game G if and only if it is a fixed point of the following
mapping:11
p⋆q = TGq(p
⋆) ,
[
p⋆q + βG
−1
q ∇qRq(p
⋆
q ,p
⋆
−q)
]Gq
Pq
, ∀q ∈ Ω, (40)
where [·]
Gq
Pq
is the Euclidean projection on Pq with respect to the vector norm ‖x‖Gq , (x
TGqx)
1/2.
Given Lemma 2, to reach the Nash equilibria of G , it is natural to employ an iterative algorithm,
based either on Jacobi or Gauss-Seidel schemes, using as best response for each user the mapping in
(40). Specifically, if the mapping in (40) is used in the Jacobi scheme, we obtain the simultaneous
Iterative Gradient Projection Algorithm (IGPA), as described in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5: Simultaneous Iterative Gradient Projection Algorithm
Set p
(0)
q = any feasible power allocation, ∀q ∈ Ω, and β > 0;
for n = 0 : Nit
p(n+1)q =
[
p(n)q + βG
−1
q ∇qRq(p
(n))
]Gq
Pq
, ∀q ∈ Ω, (41)
end
The sequential update of the strategies from the players can be easily obtained from (40) by using the
Gauss-Seidel scheme, and provides the sequential IGPA, as given in Algorithm 6.
11The mapping in (40) always admits at least one fixed point, since it satisfies Brouwer’s fixed point theorem [48,
Theorem 4.2.5]. In fact, each set Pq is compact and convex, and the mapping TG(p) = (TG1(p))q∈Ω in (40) is continuous
on P = P1 × · · · × PQ, since each Rq(p) is a continuously differentiable function of p and the projector operator is
continuous as well [3, Prop. 3.2c].
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Algorithm 6: Sequential Iterative Gradient Projection Algorithm
Set p
(0)
q = any feasible power allocation, ∀q ∈ Ω, and β > 0;
for n = 0 : Nit
p(n+1)q =

[
p
(n)
q + βG−1q ∇qRq
(
p(n)
)]Gq
Pq
, if (n+ 1)modQ = q,
p
(n)
q , otherwise,
∀q ∈ Ω; (42)
end
The positive constant β and the set of (positive definite) matrices {Gq}q∈Ω are free parameters that
affect the convergence property of the algorithms [3]. Sufficient conditions for the convergence of both
sequential and simultaneous IGPAs are given in Appendix F.
Remark 7 − Computation of the projection. According to the best response mapping defined
in (41) and (42), both Algorithms 5 and 6 require, at each iteration, the computation of the Euclidean
projection [·]
Gq
Pq
on the feasible strategy set Pq given in (2), with respect to the norm ‖·‖Gq . For any
given β, {Gq}q∈Ω, and p = [p
T
1 , . . . ,p
T
Q]
T ∈ P, the projections in (41) and (42), written as
TGq(p) =
[
pq − βG
−1
q fq(p)
]Gq
Pq
, with fq(p) = −∇qRq(p), (43)
can be computed solving the following convex quadratic programming:
minimize
epq
1
2
p˜Tq Mqp˜q + p˜
T
q qq
subject to p˜q ∈ Pq,
(44)
where
Mq , (1/β)Gq, and qq = qq(p) , fq(p)− (1/β)Gqpq, (45)
with fq(p) given in (43). Observe that in the special case of Gq = I, the mapping TGq(p) in (43) be-
comes the classical Euclidean projection on the set Pq, that can be efficiently computed as a waterfilling
solution, as shown in Section 3.1 (cf. Lemma 1).
Interestingly, to compute the projection in (43), a variety of alternative algorithms can be obtained,
interpreting TGq(p) in (43) as the unique solution to a proper Linear Variational Inequality (LVI)
problem [3], as we show next. Using the scaled projection Theorem [3, Prop. 3.7(b)],12 one can find
that the projection TGq(p) in (43) can be equivalently defined as the unique vector p
⋆
q ∈ Pq such that
(yq − p
⋆
q)
TGq
(
pq − βG
−1
q fq(p)− p
⋆
q
)
≤ 0, ∀yq ∈ Pq,
which, since β > 0, can be rewritten as
(LVI) (yq − p
⋆
q)
T
(
Mqp
⋆
q + qq
)
≥ 0, ∀yq ∈ Pq, (46)
12The scaled projection theorem says that, given some x ∈ Rn and a convex set X ⊆ Rn, a vector z ∈ X is equal to
[x]G
X
if and only if (y − z)TG(y − z) ≤ 0, ∀y ∈ X , where [x]G
X
denotes the Euclidean projection of x on X with respect
to the norm ‖·‖
G
.
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whereMq and qq are defined in (45). Inequality in (46) still defines a variational inequality problem (see
(35)), but computationally simpler than the original one given in (36), as the function Mqp
⋆
q + qq(p)
in (46), for any given p, is linear in p⋆q. Observe that, since Gq (and thus Mq) is positive definite, the
(unique) solution p⋆q in (46) is well-defined, as LVI in (46) admits a unique solution [3, Prop. 5.5]. A
variety of algorithms, known in the literature as linearized algorithms can be used to efficiently solve
the LVI in (46). The interested reader may refer to [30, 32, 31] for a broad overview of these algorithms.
Remark 8 − Distributed nature of the algorithms. Interestingly, both IGPAs keep the most
appealing features of IWFAs, namely its low-complexity distributed nature. In fact, as in IWFAs, also
in IGPAs each user needs only to locally measure the PSD of the overall interference received from the
other users and project a vector that depends on this interference (i.e., ∇qRq(p)) onto its own feasible
set.
Numerical Example. As an example, in Figure 4, we compare the performance of the simultaneous
IGPA with the simultaneous IWFA, in terms of convergence speed. We consider a network composed of
Q = 35 active users and compare the rate evolution of 3 out of 35 links as a function of the iteration index
n, as defined in Algorithms 3 and 5. Interestingly, the simultaneous IGPA shows similar convergence
speed than simultaneous IWFA. Thus, it can be used as a valid alternative to the simultaneous IWFA.
5 Conclusions
In this two-part paper, we have formulated the problem of finding the optimal linear transceivers in a
multipoint-to-multipoint wideband network, as a strategic non-cooperative game. We first considered
the theoretical problem of maximizing mutual information on each link, given constraints on the spectral
mask and transmit power. Then, to accommodate for practical implementation aspects, we focused on
the competitive maximization of the transmission rate on each link, using finite order constellations,
under the same constraints as above plus a constraint on the average error probability. In Part I of the
paper we fully characterized both games by providing a unified expression for the optimal structure of
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the linear transceivers and deriving conditions for the uniqueness of the NE. In this Part II, we have
focused on how to reach these equilibria using totally decentralized algorithms. We have proposed and
analyzed alternative distributed iterative algorithms along with their convergence conditions, namely:
1) the sequential IWFA, which is a generalization of the well-known (sequential) iterative waterfilling
algorithm proposed by Yu et. al. to the case where spectral mask constraints are incorporated in
the optimization; and 2) the simultaneous IWFA, which has been shown to converge faster than the
sequential IWFA; 3) The sequential and simultaneous IGPAs, which are based on the gradient projection
best response, and establish an interesting link between the Nash equilibria of the game and the
solutions to the corresponding variational inequality problem. Interestingly, the simultaneous IGPA
has been shown to have approximately the same convergence speed and computational complexity
of the simultaneous IWFA, and thus it can be a valid alternative to the algorithms based on the
waterfilling solutions. We have derived the sufficient conditions for the global convergence of all the
proposed algorithms that, although proved under stronger constraints (e.g., the additional spectral mask
constraint), have broader validity than the convergence conditions known in the current literature for
the sequential IWFA proposed by Yu et al.
We are currently investigating the extension of the proposed algorithms to the case in which the
updating strategies are performed in a totally asynchronous way [49]. The other major extension that
needs to be addressed is the situation where the channels and interference covariance matrices are
known only within an inevitable estimation error.
6 Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
First of all, observe that the objective function of the convex problem (10) is coercive on the feasible set
[47]. Hence, a solution for the problem (10) exists [47]. Since problem (10) satisfies Slater’s condition
[45, 47], the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are both necessary and sufficient for the optimality.
The Lagrangian corresponding to the constrained convex problem (10) is
L =
1
2
N∑
k=1
(xk+x0,k)
2 −
N∑
k=1
νkxk − µ˜
(
1
N
N∑
k=1
xk − 1
)
+
N∑
k=1
λk (xk − p
max(k)) , (47)
and the KKT conditions are:
xk+x0,k − νk + λk − µ = 0,
νk ≥ 0, xk ≥ 0, νkxk = 0,
λk ≥ 0, xk ≤ p
max(k), λk (xk − p
max(k)) = 0,
1
N
N∑
k=1
xk = 1,
k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (48)
with x0,k ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N} and µ , µ˜/N.
Observe that, if (1/N)
∑N
k=1 p
max(k) < 1 or pmax(k) < 0 for some k, then the problem is infeasible; if
(1/N)
∑N
k=1 p
max(k) = 1, then the problem admits the trivial solution xk = p
max(k), ∀k; if pmax(k) = 0
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for some k, then xk = 0. Here after, we thus assume that all the subcarrier indices corresponding to the
zero-valued pmax(k)’s have been removed and (1/N)
∑N
k=1 p
max(k) > 1 (to avoid the trivial solution).
First of all, observe that µ > 0 (in fact, µ ≤ 0 is not admissible, since the constraint (1/N)
∑N
k=1 xk =
1 necessarily implies xk= −x0,k − λk + µ > 0, for at least one k). If xk = 0, since νk ≥ 0 and (by
the complementary slackness condition) λk = 0, then µ− x0,k = −νk ≤ 0. If 0 < xk < p
max(k), then
νk = 0 and λk = 0; which provides xk = µ − x0,k, (observe that 0 < µ − x0,k < p
max(k)). Finally, if
xk = p
max(k), then νk = 0 and λk ≥ 0, which implies µ− x0,k ≥ p
max(k). Since, for each k, the values
of the admissible solution induce a partition on the set of the µ values, the solution can be written as
xk = [µ− x0,k]
pmax(k)
0 =

0, if µ− x0,k ≤ 0,
µ− x0,k, if 0 < µ− x0,k < p
max(k),
pmax(k), if µ− x0,k ≥ p
max(k),
k ∈ {1, . . . , N},
where µ is chosen so that (1/N)
∑N
k=1 [µ− x0,k]
pmax(k)
0 = 1.
B Properties of Waterfilling Projection
First of all, it is convenient to rewrite the waterfilling operator in (16) as
WFq (p−q) =
−σq −∑
r 6=q
Hrqpr

Pq
, (49)
where
Hrq , Γq diag
(
|Hrq(1)|
2
|Hqq(1)|
2 , . . . ,
|Hrq(N)|
2
|Hqq(N)|
2
)
,
σq , Γq
[
1/ |Hqq(1)|
2 , . . . , 1/ |Hqq(N)|
2
]T
,
∀r 6= q, q ∈ Ω, (50)
and Pq is defined in (2).
Building on (49), we derive now a key property of the waterfilling operator that will be fundamental
in proving Theorems 1 and 3. To this end, we introduce the following mapping. For technical reasons,
we first define
p˜maxq (k) ,
{
pmaxq (k), if k ∈ Dq,
0, otherwise,
(51)
where Dq is given in (18), and introduce the admissible set P
eff = Peff1 × · · · ×P
eff
Q ⊆ P, where P
eff
q
is the subset of Pq containing all the feasible power allocations of user q, with zero power over the
carriers that user q would never use, for the given power budget and interference level, in any of its
waterfilling solutions (6), against any admissible strategy of the others:
Peffq , {pq ∈ Pq with pq(k) = 0 ∀k /∈ Dq}
=
{
pq ∈ R
N :
1
N
N∑
k=1
pq(k) = 1, 0 ≤ pq(k) ≤ p˜
max
q (k), ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}
}
,
(52)
where the second equality in (52) follows from the properties of the waterfilling solution (6) (cf. Ap-
pendix A). Observe that, because of (52), the game does not change if we use Peff instead of the
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original P. For any given {αq}q∈Ω with αq ∈ [0, 1), let T(p) = (Tq(p))q∈Ω : P
eff 7→ Peff be the
mapping defined, for each q, as
Tq(p) , αq pq + (1− αq)
−σq −∑
r 6=q
Hrqpr

Peffq
= αq pq + (1− αq)
−σq −∑
r 6=q
Hrqpr

Pq
, p ∈ Peff, αq ∈ [0, 1), (53)
where the second equality follows from (52). Observe that the operator in (53) is indeed a mapping from
Peff to Peff, due to the convexity of Peff. Moreover, it follows from (49) that all the Nash equilibria
p⋆ ,
(
p⋆q
)
q∈Ω
of game G in (1) (see (17)) satisfy the following set of equations
p⋆q =
−σq −∑
r 6=q
Hrqp
⋆
r

Peffq
, ∀q ∈ Ω; (54)
which correspond to the fixed points in Peff of the mapping T defined in (53). Hence, the existence of
at least one fixed point for T is guaranteed by the existence of a NE for game G [1, Theorem 2].
Before proving the main property of the mappingT, we need the following intermediated definitions.
Given T in (53) and some w , [wq, . . . , wQ]
T > 0, let ‖·‖w2,block denote the (vector) block-maximum
norm, defined as [3]
‖T(p)‖w2,block , maxq∈Ω
∥∥Tq(p)∥∥2
wq
, (55)
where ‖·‖2 is the Euclidean norm. Let ‖·‖
w
∞,vec be the vector weighted maximum norm, defined as [44]
‖x‖w∞,vec , max
q∈Ω
|xq|
wq
, w > 0, x ∈ RQ, (56)
and let ‖·‖w∞,mat denote the matrix norm induced by ‖·‖
w
∞,vec , defined as [44]
‖A‖w∞,mat , maxq
1
wq
Q∑
r=1
[A]qr wr, A ∈ R
Q×Q. (57)
Finally, define ‖·‖2,Dq as
‖x‖2,Dq ,
∑
k∈Dq
(xk)
2
1/2 , x ∈ RN , (58)
with Dq defined in (18). Observe that ‖·‖2,Dq is not a vector norm (as does not satisfy the positivity
property), but it is a vector seminorm [44].
The mapping T in (53) is said to be a block-contraction with modulus β, with respect to the norm
‖·‖w2,block in (55), if there exists β ∈ [0, 1) such that [3, Sec. 3.1.2]∥∥∥T(p(1))−T(p(2))∥∥∥w
2,block
≤ β
∥∥∥p(1) − p(2)∥∥∥w
2,block
, ∀p(1),p(2) ∈ Peffq . (59)
We provide now some interesting properties for the mapping T in (53), that will be instrumental to
study the convergence of both sequential and simultaneous IWFAs.
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Lemma 3 (Nonexpansive property of the waterfilling mapping) Given Dq, P
eff
q , and ‖·‖2,Dq
defined in (18), (52) and (58), respectively, let [·]
‖·‖
P
eff
q
denote the projector operator onto the convex set
P
eff
q with respect to the vector norm ‖·‖. Then, [·]
‖·‖2
P
eff
q
satisfies the following nonexpansive property:
∥∥∥∥[x ]‖·‖2Peffq − [y ]‖·‖2Peffq
∥∥∥∥
2,Dq
≤ ‖x− y‖2,Dq , ∀x,y ∈ R
N
+ . (60)
Proof. For any given ε > 0, let ‖·‖ε2,Dq denote the weighted vector norm (derived from an inner product
[44]), defined as
‖x‖ε2,Dq ,
∑
k∈Dq
(xk)
2 + ε
∑
k/∈Dq
(xk)
2
1/2 , x ∈ RN , ε > 0. (61)
Then the projector [ · ]
‖·‖ε2,Dq
Peffq
satisfies the following inequality:
∥∥∥[x ]‖·‖2
Peffq
− [y ]
‖·‖2
Peffq
∥∥∥ε
2,Dq
=
∥∥∥∥[x ]‖·‖ε2,DqPeffq − [y ]‖·‖ε2,DqPeffq
∥∥∥∥ε
2,Dq
≤ ‖x− y‖ε2,Dq , ∀x,y ∈ R
N
+ , ∀ε > 0, (62)
where the equality in (62) follows from [x0 ]
‖·‖2
Peffq
= [x0 ]
‖·‖ε2,Dq
Peffq
, due to the equivalence between the
optimization problem (10) and the same problem where the original objective function is replaced by
(‖x− (−x0)‖
ε
2,Dq
)2 =
∑
k∈Dq
(xk + x0,k)
2 + ε
∑
k/∈Dq
(−x0,k)
2 (since any x ∈Peffq is such that xk =
0, ∀k /∈ Dq); and the inequality in (62) represents the nonexpansion property of the projector [ · ]
‖·‖ε2,Dq
Peffq
in the norm ‖·‖ε2,Dq [3, Prop. 3.2(c)].
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Since ‖·‖ε2,Dq is a continuous function of ε > 0, taking in (62) the limit as ε→ 0, and using
lim
ε→0
‖·‖ε2,Dq = ‖·‖2,Dq ,
we obtain the desired inequality, as stated in (60).
Proposition 2 (Contraction property of mapping T) Given w , [w1, . . . , wQ]
T> 0, assume that
the following condition is satisfied:
‖Hmax‖w∞,mat < 1, (63)
where Hmax and ‖·‖w∞,mat are defined in (19) and (57), respectively. Then, the mapping T defined in
(53) is a block-contraction with modulus β = ‖Hmax‖w∞,mat, with respect to the block-maximum norm
‖·‖w2,block defined in (55).
Proof. The proof consists in showing that, under (63), the mapping T satisfies (59), with β =
‖Hmax‖w∞. Given p
(1) =
(
p
(1)
q , . . . ,p
(1)
Q
)
∈ Peff and p(2) =
(
p
(2)
1 , . . . ,p
(2)
Q
)
∈ Peff, define
eTq ,
∥∥∥Tq(p(1))−Tq(p(2))∥∥∥
2
and eq ,
∥∥∥p(1)q − p(2)q ∥∥∥
2
, q ∈ Ω. (64)
13Observe that the nonexpansive property of the projector, usually given in the Euclidean norm, is preserved in any
vector norm (derived from an inner product) used to define the projection.
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Then, we have:
eTq =
∥∥∥Tq(p(1))−Tq(p(2))∥∥∥
2
(65)
≤ αq
∥∥∥p(1)q − p(2)q ∥∥∥
2
+ (1− αq)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
−σq −∑
r 6=q
Hrqp
(1)
r

Peffq
−
−σq −∑
r 6=q
Hrqp
(2)
r

Peffq
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
(66)
= αqeq + (1− αq)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
−σq −∑
r 6=q
Hrqp
(1)
r

Peffq
−
−σq −∑
r 6=q
Hrqp
(2)
r

Peffq
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2,Dq
(67)
≤ αqeq + (1− αq)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
r 6=q
Hrqp
(1)
r −
∑
r 6=q
Hrqp
(2)
r
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2,Dq
(68)
= αqeq + (1− αq)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
r 6=q
Hrq
(
p(1)r − p
(2)
r
)∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
(69)
≤ αqeq + (1− αq)
∑
r 6=q
(
max
k
[
Hrq
]
kk
)∥∥∥p(1)r − p(2)r ∥∥∥
2
(70)
= αqeq + (1− αq)
∑
r 6=q
(
max
k∈Dr∩Dq
[Hrq]kk
)
er, ∀p
(1), p(2)∈Peff, ∀q ∈ Ω, (71)
where (66) follows from (53) and the triangle inequality [44]; in (67) ‖·‖2,Dq is defined in (58) and the
equality follows from the fact that Peffq sets to zero the elements not in Dq; (68) follows from Lemma
3 (see (60)); in (69) Hrq is a diagonal matrix defined as
[
Hrq
]
kk
,
{
[Hrq]kk ,
0,
if k ∈ Dr ∩ Dq,
otherwise.
(72)
Introducing the vectors
eT , [eT1 , . . . , eTQ ]
T , and e , [e1, . . . , eQ]
T , (73)
with eTq and eq defined in (64), and the matrix
Hmax
α
, Dα+ (I−Dα)H
max, with Dα , diag(αq . . . αQ), (74)
whereHmax is defined in (19). Then, the set of inequalities in (71) for all q, can be rewritten in vectorial
form as
0 ≤ eT ≤ H
max
α
e, ∀p(1), p(2)∈Peff. (75)
Using the weighted maximum norm ‖·‖w∞,vec defined in (56) in combination with (75), we have, ∀p
(1),
p(2)∈Peff and ∀w > 0,
‖eT‖
w
∞,vec ≤ ‖H
max
α
e‖w∞,vec ≤ ‖H
max
α
‖w∞,mat ‖e‖
w
∞,vec , (76)
where ‖·‖w∞,mat is the matrix norm induced by the vector norm ‖·‖
w
∞,vec in (56) and defined in (57) [44].
Finally, using (76) and (55), we obtain, ∀p(1), p(2)∈Peffand ∀w > 0,
∥∥∥T(p(1))−T(p(2))∥∥∥w
2,block
= max
q
∥∥∥Tq(p(1))−Tq(p(2))∥∥∥
2
wq
= ‖eT‖
w
∞,vec
≤ ‖Hmax
α
‖w∞,mat ‖e‖
w
∞,vec = ‖H
max
α
‖w∞,mat
∥∥∥p(1) − p(2)∥∥∥w
2,block
, (77)
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which leads to a block-contraction for the mapping T, if ‖Hmax
α
‖w∞,mat < 1, implying condition (63)
(since each αq ∈ [0, 1), ∀q ∈ Ω).
C Proof of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
Since the sequential IWFA described in Algorithm 1 is an instance of the smoothed sequential IWFA
given in Algorithm 2 when αq = 0 for all q ∈ Ω, to prove convergence of both algorithms, it is sufficient
to show that Algorithm 2, under condition (C1), globally converges to the NE of game G , for any given
set {αq}q∈Ω, provided that each αq ∈ [0, 1). We thus focus in the following only on Algorithm 2, w.l.o.g..
It follows from Corollary 3 and (53) that Algorithm 2 is just an instance of the Gauss-Seidel scheme
based on the mapping T, defined in (53). Observe that, to study the convergence of Algorithm 2,
there is no loss of generality in considering the mapping T defined in Peff ⊂ P instead of P, since
all the points produced by the algorithm (except possibly the initial point, which does not affect the
convergence of the algorithm in the subsequent iterations) as well as the Nash equilibria of the game
are confined, by definition, in Peff (see (17) in Appendix B). Convergence of the Gauss-Seidel scheme
based on the mapping T is given by the following result that comes from [3, Prop. 1.4]14 and [3, Prop.
1.1a)].
Proposition 3 If the mapping T : Peff 7→Peff defined in (53) is a block-contraction with respect to
some vector norm, then: 1) The mapping T has a unique fixed point in Peff; 2) The sequence of
vectors starting from any arbitrary point in Peff and generated by the Gauss-Seidel algorithm based on
the mapping T, converges linearly to the fixed point of T.
It follows from Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 that the global convergence of Algorithm 2 is
guaranteed under the sufficient condition given in (63). Moreover, since (63) does not depend on
{α}q∈Ω, the convergence of the algorithm is not affected by the particular choice of αq’s as well [provided
that each αq ∈ [0, 1)].
To complete the proof, we just need to show that (63) is equivalent to (C1). Since Hmax is a
nonnegative matrix, there exists a positive vector w such that [3, Corollary 6.1]
‖Hmax‖w∞,mat < 1 ⇔ ρ (H
max) < 1. (78)
Since the convergence of Algorithm 2 is guaranteed under (63), for any given w > 0, we can choose
w =w and use (78); which proves the desired result.
Conditions (C2)-(C3) in Corollary 4 can be obtained as follows. Using [3, Proposition 6.2e]
ρ(Hmax) ≤ ‖Hmax‖w∞,mat, ∀w > 0, (79)
a sufficient condition for the ⇒ direction in (78) is
‖Hmax‖w∞,mat < 1, (80)
14Observe that the set Peff defined in (52) is closed, as required in [3, Prop. 1.4].
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for some given w > 0; which provides (C2). The optimal vector w is given by the following Geometric
Programming [45]
minimize
w
max
q
∑
r=1,r 6=q
[Hmax]qr w
−1
q wr
subject to w > 0,
which provides (21).
Condition (C3) is obtained similarly, still using (78) and ρ (Hmax) = ρ
(
HmaxT
)
.
D Proof of Theorem 3
The proof is based on the same steps as in Appendix C. It follows from [3, Prop. 1.1] that both
Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 linearly converge to the unique NE of game G , starting from any arbitrary
point in P, if the mapping T defined in (53) is a contraction (see (59)) in some vector norm. Using
the block-maximum norm as defined in (55), invoking Proposition 2, and following the same approach
as in Appendix C we obtain the desired sufficient condition (C1) for the global convergence of both
Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4, for any given set {α}q∈Ω, [provided that each αq ∈ [0, 1)].
E Proof of Theorem 4
Since Algorithm 3 is an instance of Algorithm 4 when each αq = 0, we focus only on the latter, w.l.o.g..
The proof of the theorem is based on (pseudo) contraction arguments, similarly to what we already
shown in Appendix C. The main difference with respect to the approach proposed in Appendix C is
due to the alternative definition of the error vector generated by Algorithm 4, as detailed next.
Denoting by p(n) , (p
(n)
q )q∈Ω the power allocation vector generated by Algorithm 4 at iteration
n ≥ 1, with arbitrary starting point p(0) ∈ P, and using the mapping T defined in (53), we have
p(n+1) = T(p(n)), ∀n ≥ 1. (81)
Let p⋆ , (p⋆q)q∈Ω be a NE of game G (and thus a fixed point of the mapping T), whose existence is
guaranteed by [1, Theorem 2]. Define the vector e(n) , [e
(n)T
1 , . . . , e
(n)T
Q ]
T , with
e(n)q , p
(n)
q − p
⋆
q, n ≥ 1 and q ∈ Ω, (82)
and, given {αq}q∈Ω with αq ∈ [0, 1), define the Q × Q matrix Dα , diag(α1 . . . αQ). Then, for each
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n ≥ 1, we have
∥∥∥e(n+1)∥∥∥
2
≤
∥∥∥(Dα ⊗ IN )e(n)∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

−(1− α1)
(
σ1 +
∑
r 6=1Hr1p
(n)
r
)
...
−(1− αQ)
(
σQ +
∑
r 6=QHrQp
(n)
r
)

Peff
−

−(1− α1)
(
σ1 +
∑
r 6=1Hr1p
⋆
r
)
...
−(1− αQ)
(
σQ +
∑
r 6=QHrQp
⋆
r
)

Peff
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
(83)
≤ ‖(Dα ⊗ IN )‖2,mat
∥∥∥e(n)∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

(1− α1)
∑
r 6=1Hr1
(
p
(n)
r − p⋆r
)
...
(1− αQ)
∑
r 6=QHrQ
(
p
(n)
r − p⋆r
)

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
(84)
= ‖(Dα ⊗ IN )‖2,mat
∥∥∥e(n)∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥(IN ⊗ (IQ −Dα))HPe(n)∥∥∥
2
(85)
≤
(
‖(Dα ⊗ IN )‖2,mat + ‖(IN ⊗ (IQ −Dα)‖2,mat ‖H‖2,mat
)n ∥∥∥e(1)∥∥∥
2
, (86)
where (83) follows from the triangle inequality and Peff = Peff1 × · · · × P
eff
Q , where “⊗” denotes
the Kronecker product; (84) follows from the nonexpansive property of the Euclidean projector, the
definition of Peff (see (52)) and the definition of the diagonal matrices Hrq, as given in (72); and
in (85) we have used a permutation matrix P so that the vector e(n) given in (82), is replaced by
e˜(n) , Pe(n) = [e˜
(n)T
1 , . . . , e˜
(n)T
N ]
T , with e˜
(n)
k , [p
(n)
1 (k), . . . , p
(n)
Q (k)]
T − [p⋆1(k), . . . , p
⋆
Q(k)]
T , and the
matrix H is defined as
H , diag (H(1), . . . ,H(N)) , (87)
with H(k) given in (29). The matrix norm ‖H‖2,mat in (84) is the spectral norm (induced by the
vector Euclidean norm [44]), defined as ‖H‖2,mat , ρ
1/2
(
HTH
)
.
From (86) it follows that Algorithm 4 converges to the NE p⋆, from any starting point p(0) ∈ P, if(
‖(Dα⊗ IN )‖2,mat + ‖(IN ⊗ (IQ −Dα)‖2,mat ‖H‖2,mat
)n
in (86) approaches to zero as n→∞, which
is guaranteed if the following conditions are satisfied
ρ1/2
(
HT (k)H(k)
)
<
1−maxq∈Ω αq
1−minq∈Ω αq
, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N},
which provides the desired result. Given (86), the linear convergence of the algorithm follows directly
from [3, Sec. 1.3.1].
F Proof of Convergence of Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6
The global convergence of both sequential and simultaneous IGPAs, described in Algorithms 5 and
6, is guaranteed if Algorithms 5 and 6 satisfy [3, Prop. 1.1] and [3, Prop. 1.4], respectively. To this
end, since each Pq is compact (and thus also P = P1 × · · · ×PQ), it is sufficient that the mapping
TG(p) = (T
T
Gq
(p))q∈Ω : P 7→ P is a block-contraction (see (59)) with respect to the norm ‖·‖G,block ,
defined as
‖TG(p)‖G,block , max
q∈Ω
∥∥TGq(p)∥∥Gq ,2 , with ∥∥TGq(p)∥∥Gq,2 , (TTGq(p)GqTGq(p))1/2, (88)
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where TGq(p) is defined as
TGq(p) ,
[
pq − βG
−1
q fq(pq,p−q)
]Gq
Pq
, with fq(pq,p−q) , −∇qRq(pq,p−q). (89)
Rewriting TGq(p) in (89) as
TGq(p) , [RGq(p)]
Gq
Pq
, with RGq(p) , pq − βG
−1
q fq(pq,p−q), (90)
and using (88), we obtain: ∀p(1),p(2) ∈ P,∥∥∥TG(p(1))−TG(p(2))∥∥∥
G,block
= max
q
∥∥∥∥[RGq(p(1))]Gq
Pq
−
[
RGq(p
(2))
]Gq
Pq
∥∥∥∥
Gq,2
≤ max
q
∥∥∥RGq(p(1))−RGq(p(2))∥∥∥
Gq ,2
=
∥∥∥RG(p(1))−RG(p(2))∥∥∥
G,block
,(91)
where the inequality follows from the non-expansive property of the projection [·]
Gq
Pq
in the norm ‖·‖Gq,2.
From (91) it follows that a sufficient condition for TG being a contraction with respect to the norm
‖·‖G,block in (88) is that the mapping RG(p) , (RG1(p))q∈Ω : P 7→ R
QN defined in (90) be a
contraction with respect to the same norm.
We derive now sufficient conditions for RG(p) being a contraction with respect to ‖·‖G,block defined
in (88). For the sake of simplicity, we will consider only the case in which Gq = I, ∀q ∈ Ω.
We introduce the following notation: For any fq(p) , −∇qRq(pq,p−q), let ∇rfq(p) denote the
N ×N matrix, whose j-th column is the gradient vector of the j-th component of fq(p), when viewed
as function of pr. Then, we have the following result that comes directly from [3, Prop. 1.10].
Proposition 4 As Nit−→ ∞, the IGPAs described in Algorithms 5 and 6 converge to the unique NE
of game G from any set of initial conditions in P, if there exists a scalar δ ∈ [0, 1) such that
‖I−β∇qfq(p)‖2,mat +
∑
r 6=q
‖β∇rfq(p)‖2,mat ≤ δ, ∀p ∈ P, ∀q ∈ Ω, (92)
where ‖A‖2,mat denotes the spectral norm of the matrix A.
We derive now a sufficient condition for (92). Using fq(p) , −∇qRq(pq,p−q) and (3) we have
∇rfq(p) = Dq(p)Hrq, (93)
where
Hrq , diag
({
|Hrq(k)|
2
|Hqq(k)|2
}
k
)
, Dq(p) , diag


1(
1
|Hqq(k)|2
+
Q∑
r=1
Γ
−δrq
q
|Hrq(k)|
2
|Hqq(k)|2
pr(k)
)2

k
 .
(94)
Using (94), condition (92) becomes
max
k
∣∣1−β [Dq(p)]kk∣∣+ β∑
r 6=q
max
k
[Dq(p)Hrq]kk ≤ δ, ∀p ∈ P, ∀q ∈ Ω. (95)
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A sufficient condition for (95) is
∑
r 6=q
max
k
[Hrq]kk ≤
δ −maxk
∣∣1−β [Dq(p)]kk∣∣
βmaxk [Dq(p)]kk
, ∀p ∈ P, ∀q ∈ Ω. (96)
It is straightforward to see that it is always possible to find proper (sufficiently small) β > 0 and
δ ∈ [0, 1) (close to one) such that (96) is satisfied, provided that
∑
r 6=q
max
k
[Hrq]kk = Γq
∑
r 6=q
max
k
∣∣H¯rq(k)∣∣2∣∣H¯qq(k)∣∣2 d
γ
qq
dγrq
Pr
Pq
< εq, ∀q ∈ Ω, (97)
where
εq = min
p∈P
mink [Dq(p)]kk
maxk [Dq(p)]kk
≤ 1, (98)
and Dq(p) is defined in (94).
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